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Abstract
In this paper, we study how regulators may improve upon the efficiency of
their energy technology adoption programs by exploiting readily observable
information to limit rent extraction by firms. Using panel data on 862 in-
vestment decisions in the Netherlands, we find that rent extraction is closely
linked not only to technology characteristics, but also to the firm’s capital
budgetting technique. In particular, we find that firms are more likely to
extract rent when either the technology’s pay-back period or its required in-
vestment is lower, but less likely if they do not use a formal capital budgeting
technique. Standard firm characteristics, such as size and sector, correlate
with firms’ use of capital budgeting techniques, thereby partly resolving the
regulator’s asymmetric information problem.
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1 Introduction†
Energy efficiency is quickly becoming a key ingredient of the energy and environmen-
tal policy mix (Convery, 2011). For that reason, many governments have brought in
investment subsidies to stimulate the adoption of new technologies, such as hybrid
vehicles, solar panels or energy saving equipment. The effectiveness of such subsidies
is, however, widely challenged (International Energy Agency, 2011). For example,
any attempt by regulators to ‘green’ investment decisions towards technologies with
low energy use must - according to standard principal-agent theory - be bristling
with pitfalls. Along this line of thought, every energy technology adoption (ETA)
program must suffer heavily from rent extraction, which has its roots in the regula-
tor’s imperfect observation of the agent’s behavior in response to the program. For
instance, Wirl in a series of papers (Wirl, 1995, 1999 and 2000) argues that ETA
programs, such as those under the US Demand Side Management (DSM) program,
typically only reach those agents that are already inclined to invest, giving rise to
adverse selection, or induce agents to conceal their type, leading to moral hazard.
However, by using information that is both observable and correlated with the
probability of the agent obtaining a rent from the ETA program, regulators might
tighten the eligibility for their ETA programs and, accordingly, design so-called
‘tagged’ incentive schemes (Akerlof, 1978). Basically, tagged incentive schemes use
observable information on agents’ decisions as a screening device.1 This decreases
rent extraction arising from either adverse selection or moral hazard by enabling
regulators to exploit the existing heterogeneity between seemingly homogeneous
(investment) decisions.
For example, within the context of energy technology investments by firms, the
regulator might use the information that is implicitly revealed by the firm’s choice
of technology. Consider a firm investing in a heat pump and applying for a subsidy.
The information revealed by this particular investment is that the firm has a demand
for heat. As a consequence, the regulator knows that the alternative investment for
this firm would have been - depending on the availability of natural gas - either
a less efficient heat pump or a boiler. The firm, therefore, cannot credibly mimic
†We thank Maximilian Auffhammer for very constructive comments. Earlier versions of this
paper also benefited from discussions at the 2009 Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists Summer Workshop in Washington DC, and the 2008 Environmental and Resource
Economists Conference in Thessaloniki.
1The advantages of ‘tagging’ are well documented, for instance in the context of welfare pro-
grams (Parsons, 1996) and in health economics (Zivin and Zilberman, 2002).
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being of another type, because the regulator can use market shares of alternative
investments as a screening device. For example, if the firm were to pretend to invest
in a very inefficient heating technology with a low market share, the regulator would
be able, at least with some probability, to ‘expose’ the firm.
To the best of our knowledge, the question of whether and how regulators might
exploit observable information to reduce rents in the context of firms’ investment
decisions is hardly studied in the literature. In particular, we know of no empirical
analysis that has studied which information might be useful in reducing rent extrac-
tion by firms.2 In this paper, we study this question in the context of two Dutch
ETA programs.
The most obvious candidates for observable and correlated information in our
context are technology and firm characteristics. Using engineering studies or other
technical analyses, technology characteristics can usually be quite easily observed,
including an assessment of the potential financial profitability of a technology based
on some imputed (bottom-up) analysis. More difficulties arise when finding an
appropriate screening device for firm characteristics. From DeCanio and Watkins’
(1998) study of firms’ participation decisions in the voluntary Green Lights program
of the US Environmental Protection Agency, we know that the decision to join the
Green Lights program is associated systematically with firm characteristics, such as
size (number of employees), sector and profitability (earnings per share, expected
future earnings growth).3 In addition, this study also observes that internal charac-
teristics of firms seem to influence decision-making by firms in ways not measured by
conventional investment analysis, in particular those focusing on the cost of capital
and the standard net present value calculations.4
We believe, however, that it is hardly surprising that firm-specific characteristics
matter. In particular, internal financial decision-making procedures vary largely
across firms. As Graham and Harvey (2001) report, firms typically vary as to how
2For instance, previous empirical work on the DSM program has focused exclusively on house-
hold decision-making and has not accounted for the role of observable information in relation to
free riding (e.g., Malm, 1996; Haugland, 1996; Loughran and Kulick, 2004). The same holds for re-
cent work on tax rebates for hybrid vehicles (Chandra et al., 2010; and Gallagher and Muehlegger,
2011).
3DeCanio and Watkins (1998) test the conventional theory that is based on the conjecture that
financial analysis of the potential profitability of Green Lights investment should not vary across
firms, so ‘the presence of these firm-specific influences is evidence that the conventional model of
investment decision-making is inadequate in this case.’(p. 106).
4The study also recognizes the opportunity for regulators to exploit this heterogeneity by an
improvement of information dissemination, but provides no concrete suggestions.
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they make (i.e., frame) their investment decisions. Whereas large firms rely heavily
on present-value techniques and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), small
firms are more likely to use the pay-back criterion - if they use capital budgeting
techniques at all. Such differences will have an effect on how firms evaluate energy
efficiency investment opportunites, which, in turn, is likely to have an impact on rent
extraction as well.5 However, such characteristics are notoriously difficult to observe,
in particular if internal decision-making procedures are responsible for the observed
differences. Such procedures are typically unobservable and pose a serious challenge
to regulatory agencies when designing effective and efficient ETA programs.
To study whether and how observable and correlated information might be help-
ful for improving the design of such programs, we collected data on 862 investment
decisions by both profit and not-for-profit firms participating in one of two ‘tagged’
Dutch ETA programs. Both programs aim to increase the adoption and penetration
of innovative energy-saving technologies by partially compensating firms for their
investment-cost differential. Under these programs, the regulator restricts com-
pensation of the investment-cost differential to technologies whose market share is
‘small’ and whose energy-saving potential is ‘large’.6 Using information from the
regulatory agency on both programs, we compiled a unique data set covering 20
different energy-saving technologies across 75 four-digit sectors. For all investment
decisions in our data set, we not only know the technologies’ economic and physical
characteristics, but also the actual decision-making procedure used by the firms and
whether - according to their own judgement - their investment decision changed in
response to the ETA program. We use this data set to evaluate whether and how
free riding is related to any of the observable information in our data set. Regulators
may use such information to minimize rent extraction by firms in the Dutch ETA
programs by assigning to every firm a probability that it is free riding their program.
Alternatively, regulators may restrict the eligibility criteria by either dropping tech-
nologies or restricting access for certain types of firms.7
Our results are based on a bivariate probit model and confirm, first of all, the
5Recall Hausman’s (1979) finding that there is remarkable heterogeneity among households, as
revealed by their (imputed) discount rates in making energy investment decisions in durables.
6These eligibility criteria, i.e., what is considered to be ‘small’ and ‘large’, are updated on a
yearly basis.
7We want to stress that the nature of our data set does not allow us to extend our results to
firms outside our sample, i.e., to firms that did not adopt these technologies at all or to firms
that adopted these technologies but did not file an application under either one of the Dutch ETA
programs.
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importance of firm characteristics in the rent distribution. In particular, we find
that the framing of investment decisions by firms is strongly correlated with the
probability of being a free rider. In addition, we find that the way in which firms
frame their investment decisions is correlated with observable characteristics such
as the size of the firm and the sector in which it is active. In our sample of firms,
about half claim not to use any capital budgeting technique to evaluate investment
decisions8 and the other half compute the economic consequences of an investment
project explicitly but mainly through the simplest of capital budgeting techniques,
viz. the pay-back period (PBP). We find that larger firms are more likely to use
the pay-back period as a capital budgeting technique and that the use of the pay-
back period differs substantially across sectors. Compared with horticultural firms,
both agricultural and transport firms are much less likely to use a capital budgeting
technique. In addition, we find clear evidence of the importance of technology
characteristics in the rent distribution. Firms investing in technologies with long
pay-back periods are less likely to be free riders than firms investing in technologies
with short pay-back periods. Also, firms investing in expensive technologies are less
likely to be free-riders than firms investing in cheap technologies. This confirms our
conjecture that the regulator may use both firm and technology characteristics as a
screening device for reducing rent extraction.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information on
the two ETA programs in the Netherlands that form the basis for our analysis.
Section 3 presents our empirical model, while Section 4 presents the results. We
conclude in Section 5.
2 Background and Data
This section provides background information on the characteristics of the two ETA
programs that we evaluate, the so-called energy investment tax credit program (EIA)
targeted at for-profit firms and the energy investment subsidy program (EINP)
targeted at not-for-profit firms.9 These ETA programs aim to stimulate the adoption
of technologies with desirable characteristics from a social perspective, such as a
reduction of CO2 emissions. Examples of such technologies are wind turbines, high-
8This effect does not hinge on whether the firm is a for-profit firm or a not-for-profit firm.
9We use the Dutch Acronyms EIA (‘energie-investeringsaftrek’) and EINP (‘subsidieregeling
energievoorzieningen in de non-profit en bijzondere sectoren’) to denote this tax credit and subsidy
program respectively.
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efficiency glass and insulation.
Under both programs, firms investing in energy-saving or renewable technologies
receive a partial compensation for their investment costs. The EIA compensation
is a tax deduction, whereas the EINP compensation is a subsidy. Under both pro-
grams, the advantage for firms varies with the level of investment and does so at a
decreasing rate.10 Under the EIA, the compensation is determined by the product
of the tax credit and the firm’s marginal tax rate. In our sample, the net advantage
varies between 14% and 33% of the amount invested.11 For-profit firms may back-
wards (three years) or forwards (seven years) any net operating losses, which in most
instances will allow them to cash the tax deduction up to any present value consid-
erations. Under the EINP, not-for-profit firms may obtain a subsidy between 14.5%
and 18.5% of the amount invested. Typically, the number of EINP applications has
been about 10% of the number of EIA applications.12
Both ETA programs use the so-called Energy List to determine upfront which
technologies and firms are eligible for compensation and which are not.13 In the
1997-2005 period, the Energy List contained between 80 and 110 technologies. In a
typical year, the enforcement agency Senter renews, usually tightening, the eligibil-
ity criteria of around 30% of the technologies present on the Energy-List. Criteria
for inclusion of technologies on the Energy List are that: (i) the use of the tech-
nology should result in a substantial reduction in energy use or emissions; and (ii)
the technology is not common. Only a small number of technologies, such as insu-
lation, energy-efficient lighting systems and frequency converters, appear (or have
appeared) on both lists.
Table 1 presents information from the regulatory agency Senter on the num-
ber and size of applications for the EIA between 1997 and 2003.14 Since 1997, the
number of applications has grown steadily until, in September 2002, the EIA pro-
10In 1997, the tax deduction granted under the EIA varied between 52% for investments up to
e2̃9,000 and 40% for investments larger than e2̃24,000. The investment figures are updated yearly
with the consumer price index. As of 2002, the tax deduction is 55% irrespective of the size of the
investment.
11For the time period covered by our sample, Dutch tax rates were 35% for limited liability
companies and varied between 33% and 60% for other firms, such as partnerships and one-man
businesses.
12The EINP was terminated in 2001.
13The current Energy List can be downloaded from http://regelingen.agentschapnl.nl/content/energie-
investeringsaftrek-eia (in Dutch).
14Unfortunately, comparable information is not available for the EINP.
6
gram was temporarily suspended because of oversubscription.15 To prevent future
oversubscription, Senter tightened the criteria for eligibility as of 2003. Over the
years, around 90% of EIA applications have been submitted by small companies,
i.e., companies with a maximum of 100 employees. The share of investments by
small companies has risen from 32% in 1998 to 87% in 2003. Furthermore, every ap-
plication under the EIA or EINP is checked by Senter to prevent fraudulent claims;
such checks may include company visits to detect whether the technology filed has
indeed been installed. On average, Senter approves 80-85% of the amount claimed.
Moreover, a small number of applications are withdrawn voluntarily, representing
around 3-6% of the amount claimed.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
To determine the degree to which the use of observable characteristics may reduce
the rent-incentive trade-off, we compiled a micro panel data set with information
from Senter, which was supplemented with field data obtained from a survey among
firms that were granted the subsidy between 1997 and 1999. Using the Senter
database, we selected 20 technologies (see Table 2) on the basis of the following
criteria. First, each of the selected technologies had to have been continuously on
the Energy List between 1997 and 1999 in order to avoid strategic behavior by firms.
Second, technologies for which there were fewer than 20 successful applications were
excluded from our sample. Finally, we selected the top-20 technologies as measured
by the sum of the firms’ individual investment costs. Of the 20 selected technologies,
10 belonged to the EIA program only, seven to the EINP program only, and the
remaining three to both the EIA and EINP programs.
Based on the selection procedure described in the previous paragraph, we ob-
tained 4,967 and 513 records from Senter for the EIA and EINP, respectively.16
After corrections for partnership firms as well as for applicants applying for more
than one technology, we sent our questionnaire to 2,353 EIA-applicants and all
513 EINP applicants. From the response of 776 surveys (33.0%) for the EIA and
237 surveys (46.2%) for the EINP, 673 and 189 surveys, respectively, proved to be
15This was due to a small number of extremely large applications, which would have nearly
doubled the 2002 expenditure under the program.
16Under the EIA program, partnership firms are required to submit separate applications for all
partners corresponding to their share in the partnership. For our purposes, we considered these
partners as a homogeneous agent when making their investment decision. This reduced the EIA
database from 14,837 to 4,967 observations. Note that under Dutch law, partnership firms cannot
be not-for-profit firms.
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useful in that they were completely filled out. Response rates were representative
across the technologies except for some minor under-representation of insulation and
energy-conserving cooling and of freezing equipment, type B.
From the Senter database, we obtained information on the type of technology,
the level of investment, the year in which the application was submitted and the
sector in which the firm operated. Senter also provided us with the reference tech-
nologies, i.e., the technologies that firms would have invested in otherwise. Senter
determined these reference technologies, their costs and energy use on the basis of
a 1999 survey and expert opinion. For 12 of the 20 technologies investigated, the
reference technology is characterized by ‘no investment’.
We used these reference technologies together with information on sectoral energy
prices supplied by the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis to
compute firm-specific pay-back periods, both in years and in euro per TJ.17 These
sectoral energy prices are a good proxy for the energy prices paid by individual firms
in our sample, because most firms in our sample paid advertised tariffs until January
2002.18 Table 2 provides further details on the characteristics of the technologies
analyzed in our sample, such as the investment costs of the (reference) technology,
the EIA tax credit or EINP subsidy measured as a percentage of the additional
investment cost, the pay-back period and number of observations. Note that all
information in Table 2 is based on firm-specific numbers.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
The questionnaire supplemented the Senter database with information reported
by the firms about their background characteristics, such as turnover and legal
17Pay-back periods measured in years were obtained by dividing the additional investment of
the energy-saving technology by its yearly energy saving in euros. Pay-back periods in euros per
TJ, which we will refer to as physical pay-back periods, were obtained by dividing the additional
investment of the energy-saving technology by its yearly energy saving in TJ.
18The Dutch electricity market was liberalized for large users on 1 January, 1999, followed by
medium users on 1 January , 2002. The corresponding dates for the gas market are 1 January, 2001
for large users and 1 January, 2002 for medium users. Using Senter’s information on firms’ turnover
and number of employees, we conclude that, prior to 2001, a maximum of 3.1% of the firms in our
sample was able to buy electricity or gas on a liberalized market, implying that their (negotiated)
prices would substantially deviate from the sectoral energy prices. After 2001, liberalization might
have affected most, if not all, energy prices. However, competition in the Dutch electricity market
lacked contestability in the early stages (Newbery, 2002), and was virtually absent on natural
gas market as witnessed by the market share (78%) of GasTerra, the Dutch incumbent, in 2004
(GasTerra, 2008).
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form.19 Furthermore, it provided detailed information on the firms’ internal decision-
making processes, i.e., the financial method they used for evaluating this specific
investment project, such as internal rate of return, pay-back period, or none. In
addition, the firms provided us with the critical values used in their evaluation, i.e.,
minimum internal rate of return or critical pay-back period. To evaluate whether
firms had changed their investment as a result of the ETA program, we asked them
whether the investment would also have been made without delay, had the firm not
been eligible for compensation. Firms also reported on the level of other subsidies,
if any, obtained for the technology in question, the information set of the firm just
prior to the time of investment (when did they learn about the technology and the
ETA program), and the prime motive for investing in the technology. To reduce
hypothetical bias, the questionnaire was accompanied by a letter signed by the
Minister that explicitly told respondents that their answers would be used by the
government to improve the ETA program in the future. This may partially explain
the high response rates relative to other surveys.
Table 3 reports sample statistics for our data set. Average investment costs in
our sample are at e7̃8,600 higher than the EIA average (see Table 1), and range from
e2̃5,700 to e3̃,118,000. Only 36% of all investments in our sample have a reference
technology, whose cost varies between e1̃,100 and e2̃,650,000. Furthermore, the
mean value of the annual energy-cost savings measured in monetary terms is e1̃2,500
(or 16% of the mean investment cost in our sample), which is considerable. Note also
that the variation in pay-back periods is substantial: whereas the average pay-back
period in our sample is 9.8 years, for some technologies it is less than a year and for
others it exceeds 40 years.20
[INSERT TABLE 3]
3 Estimation Model
A key element in the design of our two ETA programs is the Energy List. On the one
hand, this list reflects the regulator’s current judgement about which technologies
are eligible for subsidy under either of the two ETA programs. For example, the
regulator may use some (objective) characteristics of the technology, such as the
amount of energy saved per euro invested, to determine whether the technology
19See Appendix B for the complete (translated) questionnaire.
20Note that the reported pay-back periods would have been only marginally lower if we included
the other subsidies that were obtained by the respondents in the calculation of the pay-back period.
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should be eligible. On the other hand, the list is a reference point for firms to
evaluate their investment opportunities. Firms screen the technologies on this list
using their own, firm-specific internal decision-making procedure. To illustrate,
suppose that firms rank potential investments in energy technologies according to
the investments’ net present value (NPV). Standard economic theory suggests that
any rational firm should invest in the most profitable technology, provided that
its NPV is larger than zero. This should be the case irrespective of the type of
firm involved (profit or not-for-profit) or the risk class to which the firm belongs.
So if a technology on the Energy List passes the criterion laid down in the firm’s
decision-making procedure, the firm should adopt it.
As explained in the introduction, DeCanio and Watkins (1998) have shown that
for a similar type of investment (energy-efficient lighting), ‘exogenous’ characteris-
tics of firms do matter, even after controlling for differences in risk between firms.
Their analysis took the firms’ internal decision-making process for granted, however,
whereas there is evidence that firms differ in the way they ‘frame’ their investment
decisions. For instance, Graham and Harvey (2001) found that large firms rely
heavily on present-value techniques and the capital asset pricing model, whereas
small firms are more likely to use the (critical) pay-back criterion (CPBP).
We also find that there is a large variation as to how firms frame their investment
decisions. On the question of which method the firm used to evaluate this specific
investment, 41% of the firms in our sample indicated that they used the CPBP,
4% used the internal rate of return,21 and 43% claimed not to use any explicit
method for the evaluation of their investments at all.22 Particularly interesting in
our sample is the large number of firms that claims not to use any kind of (simple)
financial evaluation method. To us, it seems unlikely that the observed heterogeneity
regarding firms’ internal decision-making procedures would not systematically affect
the decisions taken by firms and, thereby, the rent distribution across firms in our
sample. If this is indeed the case, the question of whether the regulator can observe
(correlated) information regarding firm-specific characteristics, such as the internal
21Note that the internal rate of return and the CPBP are strongly related (see Sarnat and
Levy, 1969). The CPBP can be replaced by a ‘pseudo critical pay-back period’, which is equal
to (1 − (1 + r)−n)/r, where r is the internal rate of return and n is the economic lifetime of the
technology.
22The remaining 12% did not know whether their firm used a criterion or what it was; we
added them to the category of not using any method. Note also that the high percentage of firms
that claim not to use any method is not due to the presence of not-for-profit firms, because the
percentages are more or less the same for profit and not-for-profit firms.
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decision-making procedure, is even more important for our purpose.
When do we expect that a firm is likely to be free riding? This, first of all,
depends on whether the ETA program changes the firm’s behavior. For example,
if an ETA program lowers the cost of a technology to the firm, we expect that
the technology will be adopted more often, or earlier in time, even if firms differ
in (the stringency of) their internal decision-making procedures.23 We also expect
to see this if firms do not evaluate investments according to financial methods.24
Furthermore, we expect that a firm is more likely to be free riding if it uses a less
stringent criterion, e.g., a higher CPBP. We also expect technology characteristics
to matter. We hypothesize that if a firm is investing in more profitable technologies,
i.e., in technologies with a shorter pay-back period, it is more likely to be free riding.
Finally, we expect that, due to the possibility of a firm being liquidity constrained,
firms making expensive investments are less likely to be free riding.
Given the large number of firms not using any capital budgeting technique in
our sample, we use a bivariate probit model to explain, first, whether a firm is
likely to use a capital budgeting technique (in our sample, the CPBP) and, second,
whether the firm was free riding on the ETA program when making the investment.25
Accordingly, we estimate a bivariate probit model in which the first equation explains
whether a firm with certain observable characteristics, such as turnover, number of
employees and sector, uses a capital budgeting technique, yi1 = 1, or not, yi1 = 0,
and the second equation explains whether a firm is free riding, yi2 = 1, or not,
yi2 = 0. Subsequently, we refer to these equations as the ‘capital budgeting equation’





+ εi1 > 0
)
,
yi2 = 1 (X
′
2(yi1, zi)β2 + εi2 > 0) , (1)
where σi1 = zi + λ(1− zi)
23Even though option value theory has stressed the importance of uncertainty with respect to
future costs and benefits for the adoption decision (Pindyck, 1991), there is no additional effect on
the relative attractiveness of investment options related to subsidization.
24Our expectation is based on experimental evidence reported by Aalbers et al. (2009).
25We have restricted the first probit to only those firms that claim to use a pay-back period.
The very few firms using an internal rate of return are taken together with firms that claim not to
use any method. Deleting these firms from our sample has no influence on our results, which are
available upon request.
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and X ′2(yi1, zi) =
 [X1′2 X ′2] , yi1 = 1, zi = 1[X2′2 X ′2] , yi1 = 0, zi = 1
[X3′2 X
′
2] , yi1 = 0 or yi1 = 1, zi = 0
 .
Here, β1 and β2 are the regression coefficients of the explanatory variables of the








a dummy indicating whether the firm is for-profit, zi = 1, or not-for-profit, zi = 0,
while λ captures any differences in variance between the for-profit and not-for-profit
firms. Finally, (εi1, εi2) is independently and identically distributed as a bivariate
normal with correlation coefficient ρ.
We estimate both a pooled and a non-pooled version of the model. In the pooled




2 = 0. In the non-pooled version, we split our sample
into three groups: (i) rational for-profit firms, i.e., for-profit firms claiming to use
a capital budget technique, such as CPBP; (ii) quasi-rational for-profit firms, i.e.,
for-profit firms claiming not to use a capital budgeting technique; and (iii) not-for-
profit firms.27 Note that our model is a recursive simultaneous-equations model with
an endogenous set of (interacted) variables in the second probit equation where the
endogenous nature of the variables on the right-hand side of the second equation can
be ignored in formulating the log-likelihood (cf. Greene and Hensher, 2009, p. 78).




Tables 4 (capital budgeting equation) and 5 (rent equation) together present the
estimation results for our sample. We start, for the sake of reference, with the esti-
mation results for the pooled sample (see Model (1) in both tables). According to
our pooled estimates of the capital budgeting equation based on the bivariate probit,
firms with a (relatively) large turnover in our sample are significantly more likely to
use capital budgeting techniques than firms with smaller turnovers. This finding is
26We use the subscripts 1 and 2 to denote whether the variables for β and X appear in the first
or second probit equation, respectively. We use the superscripts 1, 2 and 3 to denote whether or
not a specific variable belongs only in a specific subgroup (explained later in more detail). If a
variable belongs to all subgroups, we use no superscript.
27Unfortunately, in the non-pooled model, data limitations prevent us from splitting the not-
for-profit firms into rational and quasi-rational firms.
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- in spirit - consistent with the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001). They found
that larger firms use more sophisticated capital budgeting techniques. Even though
our sample falls more or less entirely within their ‘very small firms’ category, we
also find that large firms use more sophisticated capital budgeting techniques. Fur-
thermore, the probability of using capital budgeting techniques differs significantly
across sectors (after correction for size). Compared with horticulture, firms in other
sectors, especially the transport sector, are significantly less likely to use capital
budgeting techniques. The high percentage of firms using capital budgeting tech-
niques in horticulture is not surprising, as the horticulture sector in the Netherlands
is internationally very competitive, exporting over 80% of its production.
[INSERT TABLE 4]
Looking at the results that explain whether a specific firm is more likely to
obtain a rent (Table 5), the probability of the firm being a free rider decreases
with the pay-back period (PBP) of the technology, which is as predicted. Without
support from ETA programs, firms are less likely to invest in technologies with long
pay-back periods, simply because they are less profitable, thereby decreasing the
probability that such firms are free riding. Moreover, the probability of a firm being
a free rider decreases with investment size, as shown by the negative coefficient of
INVESTMENT, which is again as predicted. According to this pooled model, a
higher CPBP has a positive effect on the probability of being a free rider, which is
also as predicted. Its coefficient is, however, statistically insignificant.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
Furthermore, note that the correlation of the unobserved factors between the first
and second equations (ρ) is -0.33 and highly statistically significant. The variance of
the unobserved factors for the capital budgeting equation is smaller for not-for-profit
firms than for for-profit firms; the coefficient in the all but last row of Table 4 in
the column of Model (1) is smaller than one. A possible explanation for this result
is that the not-for-profit sample is more homogeneous than the for-profit sample,
because these firms are predominantly found in the non-commercial services sector.28
This illustrates that consistent estimation of the rent equation indeed requires our
bivariate procedure.
28In total we have 189 not-for-profit firms in our sample, of which 140 are active in the non-
commercial services sector and 49 in the commercial services sector.
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4.2 Non-pooled sample
One possibility why the variable CPBP is not significant in the pooled model is that
only a subset of firms use this capital budgeting technique. Therefore, we explicitly
allow for variation in behavior between different types of firms and estimate a non-
pooled version of our model. Given our data limitations, we obtain the best results
if we divide our sample into the three separate groups mentioned in section 3: (i)
rational for-profit firms using CPBP; (ii) quasi rational for-profit firms not using
CPBP; and (iii) not-for-profit firms.29 Models (2) and (3) in Tables 4 and 5 present
the results of two specifications for the non-pooled estimation.
The results of the capital budgeting equation are self explanatory because they
are almost identical for the pooled and the non-pooled models. The rent equation
now produces results in accordance with our hypotheses, although interesting dif-
ferences exist between the subgroups. In particular, the first observation is that the
rational for-profit firms are, on average, more likely to free ride than the other two
groups. This is reflected in the constant, which is positive and statistically significant
for the rational for-profit firms, but insignificant for the other two groups.
Furthermore, as in the pooled model, rational for-profit firms are less likely to
obtain rents when they invest in technologies with longer pay-back periods (PBP).
However, we do not find these results for for-profit firms that frame their investment
decision without using a capital budgeting technique. For this subgroup, PBP re-
mains statistically insignificant (results are available on request). However, when we
allow for a different ‘rule of thumb’ for decision making, i.e., a pay-back period ex-
pressed in euros per TJ, we again obtain a significant coefficient of the right sign (see
Model (2)). This measure reflects the investment-cost differential with the reference
technology relative to the (physical) units of energy saved. One might consider this
to be a much simpler ‘rule of thumb’ that requires only very limited information to
evaluate the relative performance of the subsidized technology. With this specifica-
tion, we obtain the same result as for the rational for-profit firms: longer pay-back
periods still matter, but the probability of free riding for those firms depends on
what we label the PHYSICAL PBP. This finding justifies our label ‘quasi-rational’.
The results for our INVESTMENT variable are also remarkably different across
our subsample. Whereas the investment level has almost no explanatory power for
29We also estimated our sample for two (rational versus quasi-rational firms) as well as for
four (rational versus quasi-rational in for-profit and not-for-profit firms) separate groups. In all
cases, the results are less convincing (e.g., all results for the not-for-profit firms turned out to be
statistically insignificant). Results available on request.
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the rational for-profit firms (remember that these firms are already more likely to
be free riders in general), high investment levels reduce the likelihood of free riding
for the quasi-rational for-profit firms as well as for the not-for-profit firms, although
the effect is not statistically significant for the latter group. This is consistent with
our hypothesis and might be explained by the much simpler ‘rule of thumb’ applied
in investment decisions by quasi-rational firms. In particular, the likelihood that
they are liquidity constrained is likely to increase with larger investments.
Finally, note that the variable CPBP is still not statistically significant in Model (2)
even though it is of the expected sign and its explanatory power is strongly improved
relative to the pooled model. One reason could be that the effect of the CPBP on
the probability of free riding interacts with the economic lifetime of a technology.30
A longer CPBP might raise the probability that a firm is free riding, but only for
investments with a comparable economic lifetime. Interacting the CPBP reported
by these firms with dummy variables indicating the economic lifetime of the invest-
ment (ELT10, ELT15 and ELT50 for technologies with a lifetime of respectively 10,
15 or 50 years), confirms again our expectation (see Model (3) in Table 5). Now
the coefficient of the CPBP term shows up statistically significant for two out of the
three categories.
The results for the not-for profit sector are statistically insignificant. We suspect
that the insignificance is due to data limitations because there are relatively few not-
for-profit firms in our sample. Finally, note that the correlation of the unobserved
factors between the first and second probits (ρ) in the non-pooled model is 0.61,
which is much higher than in the pooled model.
4.3 Robustness
Surveys in general may suffer from policy response bias, i.e., respondents could
anticipate potential negative effects of their answers on future policy decisions. In
our case, firms might be inclined to answer that they have changed their decision
to buy the energy-saving technology because of the ETA programs, i.e., that they
are not free riding. Otherwise, the regulator might constrain future possibilities of
obtaining rents.
We have several reasons to believe that the potential impact of such a response
bias in our sample is limited. First, and most important, is the observation that, on
30The economic lifetime of a technology is taken to be similar to the depreciation period allowed
under Dutch accounting law.
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average, half of our sample by no means answered strategically in this way, simply
‘admitting’ that they are free riding. In addition, the percentage of firms that admit
to free riding varies enormously between technologies (see Table 2). For example,
only 17% of the firms investing in a wind turbine admit that they are free riding
compared with 69% of the firms investing in energy blinds. Other technologies with
high levels of free riding are heat registration systems (67%), energy-conserving
cooling and freezing equipment, type A (64%), and frequency converters (64%).
The high level of truthful firms and the large variation across technologies suggest
that policy response bias is not a major issue in our sample. Moreover, we do not
expect that strategically-responding firms would ‘admit’ that their prime reason for
investing in the energy-saving technology was to obtain the subsidy or tax-credit.
Still, 14% of our firms mentioned this as their prime reason for investment and, what
is more, this subsample also relatively more often claimed (72% versus 45%) that
their decision had been changed due to the ETA program.31
Second, we believe that our use of a letter on behalf of the Minister by the reg-
ulatory agency, mentioning explicitly that this research would be used for future
improvements of the subsidy scheme in the Netherlands, is very likely to have re-
duced response bias. This use of consequentialism requires trust in the regulatory
agency, which we believe exists. One indication is the response rate, which is far
above what is common for surveys among firms.32 Another sign is that many re-
spondents used the last empty field in the survey to provide us with advice and
comments on the ETA programs in the Netherlands. This is consistent with other
observations that trust in the government was quite widespread in Dutch society at
the time of our research.33
Third, the main interest in our analysis is not to establish the absolute level of
rent extraction by firms. More general inferences on the potential efficiency gains
of using observable information to reduce rent extraction would require data on a
control group of firms not subject to either of the ETA programs. Instead, our
main interest is in whether and how these stated responses vary systematically
across different types of firms that have filed an application under either of the ETA
31Other possible answers about the main reason were an upgrade of a previous similar investment
(25%), an upgrade of the entire production process (22%), a cleaner environment (8%), regulation
(3%), a better reputation (2%), and other reason (26%).
32For example, Campbell and Kamlani (1997), Freeman and Kleiner (2000), and Graham and
Harvey report response rates of 19%, 11%, and 9%, respectively.
33Source: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
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programs.34 Indeed, our aim is to illuminate the role that observable information can
play in reducing rent extraction within the current ETA programs, by linking this
observable information to free-riding behavior. Moreover, if response bias differed
systematically between our three subgroups, this would already be captured by the
fixed effects for each group.
Finally, we checked whether our results are driven by firms that have larger stakes
in not answering truthfully. Clearly, these stakes are highest for those firms that
invested most, because under the existing ETA programs the largest investments
generate the largest advantage. Model (4) in Table 6 shows that our results are
not affected by excluding the top 10% of investments from our sample, except for
the INVESTMENT variable, which - although retaining the right sign - becomes
insignificant. A possible explanation is that firms undertaking large investments are
especially likely to be liquidity constrained.
[INSERT TABLE 6]
As a further check on the robustness of our results, we explored whether the
ETA programs had an effect on the information set of the firms. The inclusion of
a technology on the Energy List of an ETA program may signal its importance to
firms and accordingly stimulate learning about it (Wene, 2000; Jaffe et al., 2003).
We would expect firms thatlearned about the ETA program only after they invested
to be more likely to be free riding than firms that already knew of the ETA program.
We tested this hypothesis by asking firms whether they obtained their knowledge
about the ETA program before, during or after the time of the investment decision.
Firms answering ‘after’ received no attention value from the ETA program. Our
results indeed confirm that these firms are more likely to be free riding (see Model (5)
in Table 6).35
34This leaves two possibilities in the absence of the scheme, i.e., (i) the firms would have canceled
the investment or (ii) they would have postponed the investment. In the estimation, we make no
distinction between postponement and cancellation. Results, available on request, are not affected
when this distinction is made.
35A possible explanation for this result is that companies that knew about the ETA program may
have ‘discovered’ their investments by looking at the Energy List. These investments may then
have received more support during the decision process or may be - on average - more profitable.
Such companies would be inclined to state that the ETA program did change their decision, i.e.,
that they are not free riding.
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4.4 Policy implications
Selection bias might be a serious shortcoming if the investment behavior of firms in
our sample is not representative for small to medium sized firms in general. Indeed,
the firms in our sample have all invested in these technologies with subsidy, so we
cannot compare their behavior with that of firms that have invested in these tech-
nologies without subsidy or have not invested at all. It should be noted, however,
that our results are useful for a regulator interested in improving the design of ETA
programs even if our sample is not representative for small firms in general. Specif-
ically, our results show that the choice of technologies on the Energy List indeed
matters for the effectiveness (as well as the efficiency) of the ETA program. The
effectiveness of the subsidy program may be even further increased by specifically
targeting (groups of) firms.
To illustrate the economic significance of our effects, we computed the marginal
effects of all right-hand-side variables in Model (3) on the probability of free riding
(see Table 7).36 According to our estimates an increase of the PBP by 1 year
reduces the probability that a rational for-profit firm is free riding by 0.007, whereas
an increase in the PHYSICAL PBP by e1̃ per TJ reduces the probability that a
quasi-rational for-profit firm is free riding by 0.004. Moreover, an increase in the
investment by e1̃000 reduces the probability of free riding of a quasi-rational for-
profit firm by 0.11, of a not-for-profit firm by 0.19 (not significant), but increases
the probability of free riding of a rational for-profit firm by 0.023 (not significant).
[INSERT TABLE 7]
Regarding firm characteristics, we find that firms using capital budgeting tech-
niques have a 0.073 higher probability of free riding (compared with firms not using
capital budgeting techniques). Although regulators cannot observe the type of firm
(rational or not), they might use observable correlated information, such as the size
and sector of the firm, to improve the effectiveness of their ETA program. For ex-
ample, firms with a large (medium) turnover have a 0.017 (0.008) higher probability
of free riding than firms with a small turnover. Moreover, firms active in the hor-
ticulture sector have a 0.015 to 0.029 higher probability of free riding than firms in
other sectors. Hence, we conclude that the regulator might improve the effectiveness
of the Dutch ETA programs by using observable information on both technologies
and firms to decrease the percentage of firms that are free riding. In addition, the
36See Appendix A for more details. Probabilities are measured on a scale between 0 and 1.
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regulator might use information that is correlated with non-observable information,
such as the use of (specific) capital budgeting techniques.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that adoption decisions regarding subsidized technologies
differ markedly between different types of firms and across technologies. Specifically,
we contribute to the existing empirical literature by shedding new light on why firms
invest in certain technologies, and how those decisions are affected by the use of a
tax credit or subsidy. Using a unique micro data set on individual investments in
energy-saving technologies, we find clear evidence to support our conjecture that
the probability that a firm obtains a rent from a subsidy program depends on both
firm- and technology-specific characteristics. Interestingly, these characteristics are
either directly observable or correlated with other observable information, and could
therefore be exploited by the regulator to improve its energy technology adoption
program by restricting eligibility.
One remarkable finding of our empirical study is the systematic difference be-
tween firms in how they frame their investment decisions. In our sample, about half
of the firms claim not to use any capital budgeting technique to evaluate investment
decisions. The other half do indeed compute the economic consequences of an in-
vestment project, but mainly through the simplest of techniques, i.e., the pay-back
period. These differences in behavior, however, are nicely correlated with observable
characteristics such as the size of a firm and the sector in which it is active. Agricul-
tural and transport firms are much less likely to use a capital budgeting technique
than horticulture firms, for example.
The other remarkable finding is that this distinction in subgroups also matters for
rent extraction from the ETA programs that we evaluated. First of all, firms using
capital budgeting techniques are more likely to obtain such rents than firms not using
capital budgeting techniques. Second, rents are typically larger for both types of
firms when they invest in technologies with shorter pay-back periods. Apparently,
firms not using capital budgeting techniques still evaluate their investment in a
systematic way. Our results suggest that they trade off the additional investment
against the amount of energy saved, instead of the value of energy saved. That is,
they behave as if they are using a physical pay-back period. Third, these quasi-
rational firms are also more likely to be free riders if they invest smaller amounts.
Taken together, these findings clearly show that, in our sample, framing affects
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investment, i.e., the investment decision taken by a firm depends on the capital
budgeting technique it uses. We believe that this observation may be representative
for a much wider class of investments.
These findings show the importance of observable information for screening tech-
nologies and firms that are eligible for subsidization. Restricting eligibility to tech-
nologies with long(er) pay-back periods is one example in this respect. On the other
hand, the regulator may select technologies that are typically bought by quasi-
rational firms, which are usually small firms. In this way, the regulator reduces the
probability that firms will be free riding. Thus we find clear indications that such
‘tagging’ is a useful and productive strategy for regulators if they aim to stimulate
the penetration of certain energy-efficient technologies. This is not surprising, as
the advantages of tagging are well known in other areas. What impact tagging may
have in the context of energy technology adoption programs in general remains a
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Number and size of applications under the EIA
Year Number of applications Amount claimed ( m e ) Average investment ( e )
1997 10,366 430 41,500
1998 14,145 656 46,400
1999 17,408 587 33,700
2000 25,815 695 26,900
2001 28,139 1,058 37,600
2002 17,228 1,344 78,000
2003 15,518 834 53,700
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Table 2: Technology characteristics
N Investment Reference Saving Subsidy1 PBP2 Free rider
1,000 e 1,000 e 1,000 e % year %
Combined heat and power 61 224 0 51 18 4.2 48
Condenser 50 37 19 13 42 1.4 49
Draught sealing 5 39 0 1.1 18 36.6 60
Energy blinds 68 38 0 7.5 22 4.9 69
Energy conserving cooling and
freezing equipment, type A 11 22 18 2.2 115 2.1 64
Energy conserving cooling and
freezing equipment, type B 58 39 31 1.5 106 4.9 60
Energy efficient lighting 30 45 30 2.5 54 6.0 30
Frequency converter 66 17 0 5.3 20 3.8 64
Generic construction techniques 27 45 0 13 21 3.6 55
Generic equipment, process techn. 26 215 0 131 17 1.8 61
Heat buffer 51 44 0 5.6 21 7.8 59
Heat pump 7 29 9.6 6.0 27 3.3 43
Heat recovery from ventilation air 10 59 0 17 18 3.4 40
Heat registration system 6 11 0 0.4 19 27.3 67
High-efficiency boiler 93 51 34 2.0 54 7.9 58
High-efficiency glass 8 128 105 1.6 93 14.5 61
Insulation 207 27 0 1.2 21 23.0 41
Lightweight semi-trailer 53 323 274 7.9 117 6.1 36
Weather-dependent optimizer
of non-residential heating 7 25 0 4.7 18 5.3 42
Wind turbine 18 324 0 43 18 7.6 17
1Compensation as a percentage of additional investment costs.
2Mean PBP (measured in years) calculated by dividing additional investment of technology by its yearly
energy saving (in euros) using sector-specific energy prices in 1999.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics1
Variable Unit Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Decision not altered by subsidy dummy 0.51 n.a. 0 1
Investment cost 1,000 e 78.6 221.6 25.7 3,118
Investment cost reference technology2 1,000 e 26.1 150.8 1.1 2,650
Energy saved per year:
- monetary 1,000 e 12.5 51.2 1.47 1,131
- non-monetary TJ 1.91 6.54 0.00 100.3
Price of electricity e 7.7 1.2 3.4 12.0
Price of gas e 17.0 5.5 8.4 28.7
Pay-back period (PBP) years 9.8 9.1 0.8 41.7
PHYSICAL PBP e /TJ 149.7 120.7 15.0 445.0
EIA or EINP subsidy as % of investment % 19.9 3.3 13.7 26.4
PBP including EIA or EINP subsidy years 9.4 9.6 -66.5 41.7
Estimated Economic lifetime years 22.1 16.5 10.0 50.0
Critical pay-back period (CPBP)3 years 3.13 4.3 0.0 31.4
Obtained VAMIL subsidy dummy 0.18 0.39 0 1
Obtained other subsidies dummy 0.11 0.31 0 1
No attention value dummy 0.39 0.49 0 1
Small to medium company4 dummy 0.25 0.43 0 1
Medium company4 dummy 0.42 0.49 0 1
Large company4 dummy 0.22 0.42 0 1
1Summary statistics apply to 862 observations over the three-year period 1997-1999.
2Reference technology applies to 310 observations.
3Critical pay-back period applies to 384 observations.
4Turnover: small to medium companies below e 0.45m; medium companies between e 0.45m
and e 4.5m; large companies more than e 4.5m.
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Table 4: Results capital budgeting equation
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Pooled Non-pooled Non-pooled
MEDIUM TURNOVER 0.25∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.20∗∗
(2.36) (2.08) (2.07)
LARGE TURNOVER 0.51∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
(3.51) (3.50) (3.53)
INDUSTRY -0.41∗∗ -0.39∗∗ -0.38∗∗
(2.31) (2.31) (2.27)
COMMERCIAL TRADE -0.47∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗
(2.80) (2.59) (2.67)
TRANSPORT -0.68∗∗∗ -0.63∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗
(3.43) (3.32) (3.43)
COMMERCIAL SERVICES -0.46∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗
(2.81) (2.68) (2.62)
NON-COMMERCIAL SERVICES -0.37∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗
(2.93) (2.91) (2.93)
FOOD -0.40∗ -0.41∗∗ -0.42∗∗
(1.82) (2.01) (2.07)
AGRICULTURE -0.44∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗
(4.08) (3.96) (4.00)
HORTICULTURE -0.06 -0.06 -0.04
(0.57) (0.53) (0.42)
Variance not-for-profit firms 0.60∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.62∗∗
(2.45) (2.49) (2.48)
Notes: Dependent variable is USES CAPITAL BUDGETING TECHNIQUE.
This equation is estimated jointly with the rent equation (see Table 5).
***[**](*) denotes significance at 1[5](10) percent level.
t-statistics within parentheses.
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Table 5: Results rent equation








































Rho -0.33∗∗∗ -0.61∗∗∗ -0.63∗∗∗
(3.76) (5.68) (5.89)
Log-Likelihood -586.0 -575.7 -573.7
Notes: dependent variable is WOULD HAVE MADE INVESTMENT WITHOUT SUBSIDY.
This equation is estimated jointly with the capital budgeting equation (see Table 4).
Number of observations is 862 for all models.
***[**](*) denotes significance at the 1[5](10) percent level.
t-statistics within parentheses.
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Table 6: Results rent equation
Model (4) Model (5)


































Log L -515.1 -569.2
Notes: dependent variable is WOULD HAVE MADE INVESTMENT WITHOUT SUBSIDY;
This equation is estimated jointly with the Capital Budgeting Equation (not reported);
Number of observations is 776 for Model (4) and 862 for Model (5).
***[**](*) denotes significance at the 1[5](10) percent level;
t-statistics within parenthesis.
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Table 7: Marginal effects of the bivariate probit on E {y2|X1, X2}
Capital budgeting equation Rent equation
Dummy variables Dummy variables
MEDIUM TURNOVER 0.008∗ FOR PROFIT 0.001
LARGE TURNOVER 0.017∗ USES CPBP 0.073∗∗
INDUSTRY -0.018∗∗ Cont. variables - rational for-profit
COMMERCIAL TRADE -0.019∗∗ PBP (in years) -0.007∗∗
TRANSPORT -0.029∗∗ INVESTMENT (in 1,000 e) 0.023
COMMERCIAL SERVICES -0.018∗∗ CPBP*ELT10 (in years) 0.008∗
NON-COMMERCIAL SERVICES -0.015∗∗ CPBP*ELT15 (in years) 0.001
FOOD -0.019∗∗ CPBP*ELT50 (in years) 0.005∗
AGRICULTURE -0.019∗∗ Cont. variables - quasi-rational for-profit
HORTICULTURE -0.002 PHYSICAL PBP (in e/TJ) -0.004∗∗
INVESTMENT (in 1,000 e) -0.113∗∗
Cont. variables - not-for-profit
PBP (in years) 0.000
INVESTMENT (in 1,000 e) -0.190
Notes: **(*) denotes significance at the 5 (10) percent level.
See Appendix A for computational details.
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Appendix A Marginal Effects
We are interested in the effect of (observable) firm and technology characteristics
on the probability of free-riding. The conditional mean is
E {y2|X1, X2} = P {y1 = 1}E {y2|y1 = 1, X1, X2}










Marginal effects are calculated as in Greene (2004, p. 716). For continuous variables,
this conditional mean function is differentiated to calculate the marginal effects.
For binary variables, the conditional mean function is computed with the variable
in question set to 1 and 0. The marginal effect is the difference between these
values. Finally, the marginal effect of using a pay-back period on the decision
(not) to buy is calculated as P {y2 = 1|y1 = 1, X1, X2} − P {y2 = 1|y1 = 0, X1, X2}.
Standard errors for the estimated marginal effects are calculated by using a Monte
Carlo procedure. For each marginal effect, 5,000 draws were taken from the bivariate
normal distribution using the Choloski transformation (see Train, 2003). For each of
these draws, we computed the marginal effect. Finally, we took the 95% confidence
interval of the resulting distribution.
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Appendix B Questionnaire (for EIA only)









O Mutual insurance company
O Cooperation
O European Economic Cooperation
Question 2: What was your company’s total turnover in the year 1999?
O Less than 250,000 guilders
O Between 250,000 and 1 million guilders
O Between 1 and 10 million guilders
O More than 10 million guilders
Question 3: Could you please give us a clear description of your position within
the company?
Question 4: In general, which person takes the investment decisions within your
company?
O The person answering this questionnaire
O Someone else within the company
O Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Question 5: Which person deals with your company’s taxes and, especially, tax
deduction?
O The person answering this questionnaire
O Someone else within the company
O Some person from outside the company (accountant / tax office)
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Question 6: In which year and month was the investment decision taken?
O Month: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O Year: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Question 7: When was your company informed of the existence of this specific
capital equipment?
O Before the decision making regarding the investment
O During the decision making regarding the investment
O After the decision making regarding the investment
O Unknown
Question 8: When was your company informed of the existence of the EIA deduc-
tion option for this specific capital equipment?
O Before the decision making regarding the investment
O During the decision making regarding the investment
O After the decision making regarding the investment
O Unknown
Question 9: What has been the main reason for your company to invest in this
specific capital equipment? (Please choose one answer.)
O The environment
O The tax deduction
O Regulation (e.g., covenant, permit)
O Company image
O Innovation of the production process
O Superior capital equipment
O Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Question 10: Does your company employ a critical pay-back period or an internal
rate of return for investments; that is, does your company either require investment
costs to be recovered within a certain amount of time or use a minimum required
rate of return on investment?
O Yes, a critical pay-back period go to question 11
O Yes, an internal rate of return go to question 12
O No, a critical pay-back period nor
an internal rate of return go to question 13
O Do not know go to question 13
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O More than 10 years, namely . . . . . . years
Go to question 13
Question 12: What is this internal rate of return in your company?












O More than 15 percent, namely . . . . . . percent
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Question 13: With which statement do you agree most?
O Without EIA deduction the investment in this specific capital equipment
would not have been made at all
O Without EIA deduction the investment would have been made
in a different piece of capital equipment
O Without EIA deduction the investment in this specific capital equipment
would have been made at the same point in time
O Without EIA deduction the investment in this specific capital equipment
would have been postponed
Question 14: How large was your company’s advantage obtained from the EIA
deduction (for this investment)? In other words: how large were your tax savings?
Question 15: Within what period of time has your company recovered, or does it











O More than 10 years, namely . . . . . . years
O Unknown
Question 16: Has your company used other deduction or subsidy schemes to fi-
nance the investment in this specific capital equipment?
O Yes, the VAMIL tax deduction
O Yes, another deduction option or subsidy go to question 17
O No
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Question 17: Which other subsidy or deduction scheme has your company used
for this specific capital equipment?
O Name of scheme: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amount: . . . . . . ... Guilders
O Name of scheme: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amount: . . . . . . ... Guilders
O Name of scheme: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amount: . . . . . . ... Guilders
IF YOU HAVE FURTHER COMMENTS ABOUT THE EIA INVESTMENT DE-
DUCTION OR ABOUT THIS QUESTIONNAIRE, YOU ARE WELCOME TO
WRITE THEM BELOW.
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